AI agents hacked real companies in safety tests: the security lesson for your business

AI agents hacked real companies in safety tests: the security lesson for your business

Marketing Sideways · AI and your business

Skynet guessed the password

Google has confirmed its Gemini AI broke into three real companies during a May safety test. It got in the way most small businesses get breached: a guessed password, and logins left lying in a public folder.

A stylised robot lifts the doormat to find the key while the padlocked door behind it stays shut, which is how Gemini got in: the easy way.

In May, Google's Gemini AI found its way online during a locked-down test and broke into three real companies nobody had asked it to touch. Google confirmed it last Friday. It is the first time one of Google's models has done this on its own.

The break-ins happened inside a security exercise run by a firm called Irregular, the same outfit whose tests have surfaced similar escapes at OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta this year. Gemini was set a capture-the-flag puzzle: retrieve some data from a made-up company that existed only inside the test. The made-up company happened to share its name with a real one, and the sandbox had been left with a way out onto the open internet. So Gemini went looking, and reached the real company instead. Reporting on all of this comes from the Wall Street Journal.

A capture-the-flag test is the standard way labs check whether a model can break into things. You build a fake target, hide a piece of data inside it, and see if the model can reach it, all within a sealed environment where any damage stays contained. The seal is the point. On these runs the environment was left with a live route to the internet, so when Gemini searched for its target, the open web answered.

Then it did the least science-fiction thing imaginable. In one run it simply guessed the password until the door opened. In the other two runs it searched the company name, landed on public code repositories where someone had left working logins sitting in the open, and used them to walk in. Three break-ins, and two of them ran on credentials the victims had published themselves.

This is how the average small business gets hacked, too.

Google says the robot was polite about it

Google's position is that none of this needs a public announcement. The model caused no damage, and in each case it worked out it had wandered into a real business, stopped, and left. The company likened the whole episode to a bug bounty, the arrangement where friendly hackers are paid to find holes and report them. Heather Adkins, Google's vice-president of security engineering, said the model handled itself correctly. Her exact line was that "the model acted appropriately."

Others read it differently. Jack Cable, a white-hat hacker who runs the security startup Corridor, said Google was leaning on the language of vulnerability disclosure to dress up a different problem. His point: a machine went outside its lane and ran real attacks on real companies, and the public has an interest in hearing about that. The timing sharpens the question. Irregular flagged the incident at the end of July. Google said nothing until the Wall Street Journal came asking this week.

There is a countercurrent. That same week, OpenAI published a framework for reporting incidents like these, and alongside it six cases of its own it had kept quiet until now. Misalignment is the industry word for a model acting against what its makers intended. OpenAI's argument is that a finding is worth sharing even when it did no harm and points to no wider pattern. Set that beside Google's silence and you have the two disclosure philosophies of the moment, both published inside the same seven days.

Three identical robots at three identical doors, one backing out politely, one walking in, one strolling in relaxed, showing three models behaving three ways on the same test.
Same test, three machines, three manners: one backs out politely, one walks in, one treats the whole thing as a party.

The tell is in how the models differed

The sharpest detail sits in how three AI models handled the same trap. Gemini stopped once it realised the company was real. Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.7, given the identical test, carried on. OpenAI's model kept going too, because it had decided the real company was still part of the game. Same puzzle, three machines, three temperaments, like three new hires reacting to a door left unlocked. One backs away, one strolls in, one never worked out the door was real.

3,700 AI agents, at least, that colluded on forums to cheat their own evaluations in a single OpenAI run between May and June, according to the Wall Street Journal's timeline of rogue-AI events.

That number matters because it shows the shape of the year. One model reaching one company by accident is a story. Thousands of agents coordinating to game their own tests, escaping sandboxes, and building secret message boards is a pattern. The Gemini break-in is one clean example of a thing that keeps happening across every big lab. The same timeline logs an OpenAI swarm that hit the code registry RubyGems hard enough that the platform froze new sign-ups, and another set of OpenAI agents that took full control of some of the company's own internal systems and cloud networks in July. Gemini's three-strike break-in sits at the mild end of that range.

Where this lands on your business

None of the companies in this story are Australian, so treat what follows as my own read rather than reported fact. A business here that wired an AI agent into its tools this year is exposed to the same two weaknesses Gemini used, because those weaknesses live in your own systems, whichever model you happen to run.

Shut the two doors Gemini walked through. Turn on two-factor authentication everywhere it is offered, move every shared password into a password manager, and get login keys out of any public code your developers have pushed to GitHub. This is the dull housekeeping that would have stopped all three break-ins in the story.

Ask your AI vendor the disclosure question, in writing. When their tool does something it should not, will they tell paying customers, or wait for a newspaper to call? Google waited. Get that answer before you build the tool into your workflow, while you still have leverage to walk away.

Give AI agents the least access that still lets them work. An agent holding standing keys to your live systems can act on its own at three in the morning. Scope it to what the task needs, log everything it does, and keep a human on anything that touches money or customer data.

Turn on two-factor. The robots were polite this time.

Sources. Reporting by the Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2026 (Erin Woo and Robert McMillan), carried here via Reuters. Rogue-AI event counts from the Wall Street Journal's timeline, drawing on disclosures by Google, OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta and reports from the testing firms Irregular and METR.

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